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Judicial Decision-Making within Political Parties:  A Political Approach
Abstract: 
How do German intra-party  tribunals  manage  internal  conflicts?  More  specifically,  why  do  they
accept some cases for trial but reject others? Required by law to strictly adhere to implement rule of
law standards, German intra-party tribunals are designed to insulate conflict regulation from politics.
Meanwhile research on judicial politics highlights the role of political and strategic considerations in
accepting cases  for  trial.  Building  on the latter,  we develop  a  theory  that  emphasizes  tribunals’
political concerns such as winning elections. We test our hypotheses with a mixed-effects logit model
on a novel data set covering 1088 tribunal decisions in six German parties from 1967 until 2015. Our
findings indicate that political factors exert a strong effect on tribunal case acceptance. Tribunals are
more  likely  to  accept  cases  when  suffering  electoral  loss  and  after  losing  government  office.
Moreover,  tribunals  dismiss  cases more easily  when their  parties display relatively high levels  of
policy agreement.
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The ability of parties to manage and ultimately resolve internal conflict is not only vital for
their organizational survival but also to fulfill their basic functions within the political system.
To do so, parties adopt different kinds of conflict regulation mechanisms that can range from
hierarchical mechanisms controlled by the party leadership to non-hierarchical mechanisms
controlled by actors independent of the leadership (Bolleyer et al. 2017: 836). Despite the
growing literature dealing with different sources of party conflict1, we know only little about
the nature of procedures that organizations adopt to address this important challenge on a
day-to-day basis.2 This paper investigates one important type of procedure, namely intra-
party  tribunals,  quasi-judicial  bodies  established  within  party  organizations  to  resolve
internal  disputes and designed to mirror rule of law principles within legal  structures. In
order to function effectively, they are supposed to be neutral, independent and fair.3 Indeed
parties often claim to emulate these norms in their conflict regulation procedures, yet as
Rahat points out “…these organs are suspected (often with reason) of being partial." (2013:
141). Concerns about the impartiality of judicial bodies have been raised in an extensive
literature on the partisan leanings of state and national courts in the United States (Hein and
Ewert 2016; Kastellec and Lax 2008), which provides strong evidence that political factors
affect  the  decisions  of  courts,  with  important  repercussions  for  the  operation  of  these
bodies  within  party  organization.This  paper  takes  a  step  back  and  investigates  the
importance of political considerations in the decisions of tribunals to accept or reject cases.
Evidence of impartial judgments may mask legally neutral tribunals’ avoidance of politically
sensitive cases ‘on formal grounds'. We suggest that party tribunals indeed accept or reject
cases in line with “their political preferences” (Hein and Ewert 2014: 70). Specifically, we link
the likelihood of case acceptance to the core partisan goals of vote maximization, policy
implementation  and  the  holding  of  government  office  (Müller  and  Strøm  1999). Our
theoretical  framework  thus  provides insight  into the extent  to which tribunals  use their
power  to  advance  central  party  goals  rather  than  act  as  neutral  dispute  regulation
1 See, for instance, work on factionalism by Boucek 2009; 2012 or Zariskia 1965; on the internal dynamics in 
and evolution of new parties by Art 2011; Bolleyer 2013; Mudde 2007; or Müller-Rommel and Poguntke 2002 
or on intra-party conflict linked to government participation and intra-party democracy, Bäck 2008; 
Deschouwer 2008; Giannetti and Benoit 2008; Maor 1992; Scarrow 2005 or Seeleib-Kaiser 2010.
2 But see Gherghina 2014; Smith and Gauja 2010; Bolleyer et al 2017.
3 Independent tribunals are not only common in democracies where they are required by law such as 
Germany, Czech Republic, Romania and Portugal (Biezen and Piccio 2003). We also find them in countries such 
as Norway and UK where intra-party matters are not made subject to legal regulation (Bolleyer at al 2018).
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mechanism even in political systems where neutral decision-making within parties is legally
prescribed.
The German case provides a crucial advantage to a systematic analysis of our framework: all
aspects of party tribunals are highly regulated by the German Party Law of 1967, which
makes Germany a “least likely case” to find politicized judicial decision-making in intra–party
settings and therefore constitutes a ‘hard case’ to test our framework. If we find politicized
judicial decision-making in the highly regulated context of Germany it is highly likely to play
an even stronger role in contexts in which intra-party dispute mechanisms are less regulated.
Analyzing tribunal  decisions across six  parties and over nearly five decades,  our findings
support our central theoretical argument that German party tribunals follow a political logic
when they consider whether to accept or reject cases. First, the greater the gains parties
made  at  the  last  election,  and  hence  the  stronger  tribunals’  position  (representing  the
party’s  overall  interest)  towards  internal  challengers,  the  less  likely  cases  are  accepted.
Second,  tribunals  operating in parties that  are  programmatically  highly  cohesive are less
likely  to  accept  cases  submitted  to  them.  Third,  after  a  party  has  lost  government
(weakening  the  ability  of  the  party  to  downplay  internal  conflict),  tribunals  are  more
permissive in approving cases. 
This  study makes three main contributions to existing research going beyond the
insights of our analysis themselves. First, previous studies considered the impact of party
goals on outcomes such as coalition formation (see Pedersen 2012) but, to our knowledge,
did  not  apply  them  to  questions  of  intra-party  conflict  regulation.  Our  approach  thus
investigates the role of party goals in a new arena. Second, the study of intra-party tribunals,
which allow both party elites and ordinary members to initiate cases, is insightful for the
understanding of conflict regulation outside traditional hierarchical mechanisms controlled
by party leaders that impose solutions on internal  actors and procedurally privilege one
group of actors over others. Third, our research also has important normative repercussions.
Research on intra-party democracy have focused on ‘electoral mechanisms' (e.g. primaries)
at  the  expense  of  its  ‘legal  foundation’,  which  is  why  intra-organizational  mechanisms
established by parties to protect their members' rights remain widely understudied (but see
Biezen and Piccio 2013; Bolleyer et al 2015). Our findings not only challenge assumptions on
the neutrality of tribunal decision-making but also raise the question whether it is possible
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to  effectively  transplant  ‘court  structures’  into  political  parties  as  tribunals’  ‘rights-
protective’  effects  important  for  intra-party  democracy  and  parties’  political  aims  seem
difficult to reconcile.
1. Politicization of Judicial Decision-Making
An considerable number of scholars in political science and law (Stone Sweet 2000; Kastellec
and Lax 2008; Hein and Ewert 2016) study the politicization of judicial processes such as the
appointment  of  judges  and  judicial  review.  In  contrast,  whether  or  not  political
considerations affect the initial selection of cases by tribunals has received less scholarly
attention despite generally low acceptance rates in many legal  systems (Mak 2015).  The
existing  literature  on  case  acceptance  argues  that  court  decisions  generally  are
(co)determined  by  political  influences  such  as  judges'  political  party  affiliation,  policy
preferences (Hein and Ewert 2016; Zorn and Bowie 2010) and electoral politics (Joondeph
2008). In a classic study, Sheldon (1970) describes judges as 'politicians in robes' that do not
substantively differ from other political actors. Politicized courts, so the argument, sort cases
into  an acceptable  and a  non-acceptable  pile  before  even scheduling a  hearing in  clear
opposition  to  the  purely  formal  and  procedural  grounds  on  which  case  acceptance  or
rejection should be based (Provine 1980: 15).
Intra-party tribunals in charge of resolving conflicts within party organizations, often
claim to emulate legal and thus supposedly neutral norms and procedures of state courts.
Even when party laws severely restrict tribunals’ leeway to reject cases requiring them to
emulate rule of law principles, we nevertheless expect that intra-party tribunals are similarly
influenced  by  a  political  calculus  when  deciding  whether  to  accept  or  reject  cases.
Furthermore, even if members of the party tribunal are prevented from holding any other
party office, they still have a vested interest in the survival and success of their organization.
Thus, Joondeph’s (2008: 348) observation that the “determinants of judicial decisions, law
and politics are in many respects inextricably intertwined” deserves examinations also in
intra-party settings.
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2. A Political Account of Tribunal Decision-Making: The Importance of Votes, Policy and
Office
We propose a new framework on tribunal decision-making based on the three main party
goals of vote, policy implementation and government office identified by Müller and Strøm
(1999). Whereas some scholars stress trade-offs between the three goals, parties usually
pursue them simultaneously (Müller and Strøm: 12) and design their internal organization
towards realizing these goals (Harmel and Janda 1994; Borz and Janda 2018). Independent
tribunals are supposed to solve intra-party conflict without being affected by strategic party
goals. Consequently, the adherence to such intra-party regulations might  challenge if not
undermine a party’s pursue of these goal. In contrast, our theoretical argument emphasizes
that  even  if  tribunals  are  designed  to  be  politically  independent,  through  the  strategic
accepting  or  rejecting  of  cases,  members  of  party  tribunals  can  contribute  to  the
implementation of party goals. In the following, we outline how each goal imposes its own
constraints on tribunal decision-making.
Vote Maximization and the Bypassing of Conflict
The first  goal  that  is  expected to motivate party  behavior  is  vote  maximization directed
towards the winning of elections (Müller and Strøm 1999: 8). Achieving this goal is also vital
to achieving the two other goals, namely policy and office. Therefore, parties are expected to
reform  both  in  terms  of  policy,  personnel  and  organization  if  they  underperformed  in
elections  (Janda  1990:  5;  Harmel  and  Janda,  1994).  If  so,  we  can  expect  electoral
underperformance to affect how tribunals deal with cases submitted to them. The loss of
elections often triggers debates around how intra-organizational processes (do or should)
work and how decisions are made (Harmel and Janda, 1994). It becomes difficult for the
weakened party to downplay or ignore conflict and to reject demands of intra-organizational
reform (REF) In such a scenario, party elites – including tribunal members – will find it more
difficult to suppress conflict. This suggests that after suffering electoral loss, cases are more
likely to be taken on by intra-party tribunals.
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H1.1 (Vote Loss Hypothesis):  Tribunals are more likely to accept cases the more a party’s
electoral performance declines. 
Theorizing  the repercussions  of  parties’  vote  aspirations,  the timing of  when intra-party
conflict is handled is important. Clarke (2013:2) distinguishes between intra-party conflict
occurring during the entire inter-electoral  period and conflict  that  occurs  in  the months
immediately prior to election day. With regard to the latter, he argues that the closer parties
get to the next election, the more likely they are attracting media attention and are pressed
to present themselves as unified. Furthermore, conflict closer to election day will be recalled
by voters when going to the polls (Clark 2013: PAGE). This is  underlined by Traber et  al
(2013: 194) stating that “elections are likely to play an important role in the quest for party
unity”. If internal divisions can have a negative impacts on parties’ electoral prospects, party
tribunals  can be expected to avoid dealing with cases in the run up to elections,  which
underpins our hypothesis:
H1.2 (Electoral Proximity Hypothesis) Tribunals are less likely to accept cases the closer the 
next election.
Policy: Policy Disagreement and Responsiveness to Intra-Party Conflict
Another central goal of parties is to maximize its impact on public policy (Müller and Strøm
1999: 7). In order to do so effectively they need to present a coherent set of policies, as
parties that appear divided over policies tend to lose elections (Greene and Haber 2014) and
are less likely to enter government (Bäck 2008). The lack of a clear program often results
from the lack of agreement over policy that divides parties internally into competing factions
(see for example the fundi-realo debate in the German Green Party, e.g. Burchell 2002). Lack
of agreement also has repercussions for intra-party conflict regulation as parties need to find
a way to internally absorb conflict resulting from policy disagreement before it affects their
performance at the ballot box. In parties with lower policy agreement (i.e. a high level of
internal   disagreement  over  policy),  tribunals  play  a  central  role  in  the  management  of
conflicts.  In such a scenario,  in order to avoid that internal  conflict  negatively affect the
party’s public standing, tribunals can be expected to accept more cases to resolve conflict
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internally. Conversely, we expect tribunals that operate in parties with high policy agreement
(thus low level of policy-related conflicts) to wield greater freedom to ignore conflict and
thus to accept fewer cases: 
H2  (Policy Agreement Hypothesis): Tribunals in parties with high policy agreement accept
fewer cases than tribunals in parties with low policy agreement.
Office: Conflict Regulation Inside and Outside Government
The third party goal identified by Müller and Strøm (1999: 5) is office. The successful holding
of government office has important intra-organizational repercussions. When a government
party is busy implementing its program, its attention shifts from organizational matters to
the operation party representatives in public office (Katz and Mair 1995). Simultaneously,
government participation often brings its share of frustration to those in the organization
not involved in governing themselves,  in terms of  the compromises  necessary in  policy-
making – especially  in  coalition governments  – and the quite  common decline  in  direct
accountability of those running government to the organization outside (Müller-Rommel and
Poguntke 2002). This can fuel internal conflict and enhance the need for conflict regulation
in  a  period  during  which  the  public  display  of  such  conflict  tends  to  be  particularly
unwelcome. Therefore, while in the government (when the display of unity is particularly
important), a party might be keener and more able to downplay or ignore internal conflict to
assure its ability to effectively implement its program. This might find reflection in tribunals’
behavior, namely in the acceptance of fewer cases.
H3.1  (Government Party Hypothesis): Tribunals are less likely to accept cases when their
party is in government than when it is in opposition.
As  holding  office  raises  incentives  to  downplay  conflict,  losing  office  usually  triggers
heightened internal debate about the reasons behind the setback and about the strategy to
regain  governmental  control.  Courtney  (1995:262)  shows  that  party  authority  weakens
during  opposition  periods  and  intra-organizational  challenges  and  reforms  become
particularly  likely.  For  parties  opposition  is  a  chance  for  renewal  (LeDuc  2001)  and  a
possibility for the organization to reconnect with members and voters. These periods often
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include reforms that empower the members over party elites, which the latter might not
have agreed to if they had not lost office (Cross and Blais 2012). Losing government office
should therefore make the process of conflict regulation more permissive and increase the
likelihood of case acceptance.
H3.2 (Government Loss Hypothesis): Tribunals are more likely to accept a case after their
party has lost government
3. Germany as a Least Likely Case for ‘Tribunal Politicization’
When applying rule of law principles to intra-organizational settings, party tribunals can be
seen  as  formally  independent  and  equivalent  to  ‘state  courts’  if  neither  party
representatives in public office nor members of any party executives are allowed to take a
formal role in them. Both the German Party Law and parties’ intra-organizational rules fit
this description and thereby make Germany a  least likely case for finding support for our
hypotheses. If we find politicized judicial decision-making in Germany, less regulated intra-
party dispute mechanisms are even more likely to be affected by political dynamics.
The  1967  German  Party  Law requires  tribunals  to  be  independent  and  prohibits
simultaneous membership on a tribunal and in the party executive (Biezen and Piccio 2013:
39-40).  In  addition,  German parties  adopted intra-organizational  rules  that  establish  the
incompatibility  of  tribunal  membership  with  any  party  office  (§14  Abs  2),4 require  the
election  of  tribunal  members  at  least  every  two  to  four  years  by  a  party’s  congress,
guarantee the right to replacement of a judge given suspicion of bias (§14 Abs 4), and oblige
judges to recuse themselves in case of any conflict of interest. Furthermore, the parties’ own
statutes point out that  the party does not pay judges and the party only covers judges’
expenses  (e.g.  travel  costs,  accommodation  and  food).  This  combination  of  legal
requirements  (that  have  to  find  expression  in  party  statutes)  and  additional  intra-
organizational provisions intend to ensure tribunals’ neutrality and their efficient decision-
making that should be unaffected by political influences, strategic considerations or other
sources of bias unrelated to the nature of the case at hand.5 Hence, the only criteria by
4This also includes public office, central office and any employee of the party or any of its organs. Further they
must not receive a salary from the party in any form
5 A “party tribunal” that is chaired by the party leader or run by members of the executive would not qualify as
the equivalent to a “court” since it lacks formal independence from those who hold core powers in the party.
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which  tribunals  decide  to  accept  or  reject  cases  should  be  procedural.  Germany’s
constraining legal environment is particularly relevant in the acceptance stage. Reflecting
legal requirements, party statutes clearly outline and limit the possibilities for tribunals to
reject a case without opening a hearing, and plaintiffs can challenge the tribunal’s decision
to  reject  a  case  and request  a  reassessment.  German tribunals  can  use  three  narrowly
circumscribed justifications to reject a case:  formal  mistakes,  a  case is  outside tribunal's
jurisdiction, and a case is without merit. First, rejecting cases due to formal mistakes usually
results from missing official  deadlines or from not providing all  documents to consider a
case. Second, tribunals can reject cases if the national tribunal has no authority to rule on
the issue at hand and/or if the plaintiff did not follow the correct legal path through the
lower-level tribunals first. Third, a plaintiff’s claim is without merit if the tribunal sees no
legal basis for a given complaint in the party statutes or the plaintiffs fails to clearly justify
how the issue at hand is violating party statutes. It is in particularly the tribunals’ leeway in
interpreting the merit of claims that opens up space for political considerations. 
Covering the major parties constituting the German party system over an extensive time
period has several methodological advantages regarding our ability to test our hypotheses
due to the composition of  the resulting sample of  tribunal  decisions and the contextual
conditions in which these decisions were made (Slater and Ziblatt 2013: 1311-13). Neither
the 1967 Party Law nor the parties’ statutes implementing it have made significant changes
since its introduction, hence, legal requirements for tribunals’ decisions overtime and across
parties are thus kept constant. As our parties cover a wide spectrum of intra-organizational
decision-making cultures, we cover a wide a variety of tribunal submissions. This variation
enhances our sample’s representativeness regarding the types of conflicts parties experience
and the strategies of dealing with them. Analyzing a broad and representative sample is
particularly important, as existing research tends to focus on conflict and its regulation in
particular arenas (e.g. government coalitions) or tends to focus on particularly visible cases
of conflict within new or highly factionalized parties, which are unlikely to be representative
Such structures would qualify as hierarchical and leadership controlled structures instead (Bolleyer et al. 2017).
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of day-to-day intra-organizational conflict regulation in mainstream parties.6 7Finally, tribunal
documentation is available for an ideologically diverse set of parties up to a 48-year period
(1967–2015). During this period parties joined and left national government, experienced
electoral victories and defeats and repeatedly revised their party programs, allowing us to
test the influence of the core variables in our theoretical framework across parties and over
time. 
4. Data, Coding and Measurement
Our analysis covers all cases of parliamentary parties' national tribunals decided since the
introduction of  the 1967 German Party  Law until  2015.8 The  Institut  für  Deutsches  und
Internationales Parteienrecht und Parteienforschung (PRuF) at the University of Dusseldorf
has documented all cases for the CDU, CSU, FDP, Greens, and SPD.9 We gathered information
on decisions by tribunals of the Left Party from its party website.10 On the basis of these two
sources, we created a new dataset. The high level of formalization and documentation of
each tribunal case allowed for straightforward and unambiguous coding decisions.
Our dependent variable identifies whether a case was accepted or rejected. The coding is
based  on  tribunals’  written  justifications  of  each  rejection to  the  initiator  of  case.11 We
identified a case as “rejected” when tribunals argued that a claim was incomplete (formal
error), inadmissible (outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction), or without legal merit. Our coding of
6 Prominent examples are the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn (Reuter 2009; de Lange and Art 2011), New Democracy in
Sweden (Aylott 1995; Bale and Blomgren 2008; Jungar 2013), the Spanish UCD (Gunther and Hopkin 2002) or
the Italian Christian Democrats (Bardi 1996; Boucek 2012 and 2009).
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8 The CDU, SPD and FDP existed prior to 1967. Their statutes prior to the law show that party tribunals were 
already part of their repertoire of conflict regulation (Bolleyer et al 2018).
9 Institut für Deutsches und Internationales Parteienrecht und Parteienforschung Schiedsgerichtsurteile der
obersten Parteischiedsgerichte (PRuF) http://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/search/search-judgment.xml
10 Die  Linke.  Beschlüsse  der  Bundesschiedskommission  http://www.die-linke.de/partei/weitere-
strukturen/gewaehlte-gremien/schiedskommission/beschluesse-der-bundesschiedskommission/ 
11 In order to start a tribunal case the initiator must provide the following information in written form: (1)
Name,  address  and further  contact  details  of  initiator,  (2)  Name and address  of  the defendant,  (3)  Clear,
unambiguous claim and (4) Reasons for the initiative including a description of the events based on which
accusations are made. Once the tribunal receives the claim it reviews the case and either accepts it, leading to
a hearing, or rejects the case based on lack of merit or failure to comply with all formal requirements. In case
of rejection, the jury is required to send all participants a written justification. It has to include the following
information:  the  evidence  provided  related  to  the  case  and  a  justification  of  the  tribunal  decision  with
reference to the same evidence. Further, it needs to stress that plaintiff can appeal the initial rejection if they
wish to do so.
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the dependent variable allows us to test which factors make tribunals more likely to accept,
or conversely, less likely to reject cases.
To test our two vote logic hypotheses, we calculate the Vote Loss variable (H1.1)on the basis
of the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2016) by taking the absolute difference in vote
shares in the past two elections. For example, if a party gains 20% in 2013 and 25% in 2010
we would code a 5% vote loss for all cases after the 2013 election. When parties gain votes,
the variable takes the value of zero. We construct the Electoral Proximity variable (H1.2) that
counts the days until the next election. It reaches (0) on the day of the election and is reset
at the time until the next election approaches on the day after the election.
 
Giebler  et  al’s  Programmatic  Clarity  (PC)  Index  (2015,  2018)  serves  as  our  second
explanatory variable, Policy Disagreement (H2). The index, which builds on the Comparative
Party Manifesto (CMP) data (Volkens et al 2016),  captures how clearly parties state their
positions in thirteen different policy areas by summing the number of positive and negative
towards any of the thirteen areas in a given election. The more unambiguously positive or
negative a party’s election manifesto describes a particular policy position, the higher their
index score, which varies between “0” and “1”. The weight of each policy area in the index
derives from the number of statements all  parties dedicate towards that area in a given
election.12 We assign the value from the latest available election to each case. 
We capture the governmental dynamics of our office logic with two dummy variables: first,
Government Status (H3.1) distinguishes cases in parties in government (1)  from those in
opposition parties (0).  Second,  Government Loss (H3.2) codes the first year after a party
loses governmental power as (1) and the remaining years as (0). 
Our first control variable assesses whether the case brought forward was an appeal or not.
Most initiators likely appeal after the party tribunals rejected their  original  cases due to
technical inadequacies, and we thus expect a higher acceptance rate of appeals. 
12 Thus, even if a party’s manifesto reaches extreme ambiguous or unambiguous scores in a policy area, but 
the party itself and other parties dedicate little attention to that area overall, the party’s index score will hardly 
be affected.
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Second, our Subject variable controls whether the case covers organizational challenges (1)
or membership expulsion (0).  As the latter can be essential to sustain the organization’s
integrity and is less costly for the organization to implement we expect that organizational
challenges are more often rejected by tribunals (Cross and Katz 2013: 181). 
Third, we control for the role of the initiator within the party. Classical works predict an ‘iron
law of oligarchy' (Michels 1962: 64, 70; Duverger 1964) that would seem to suggest that
cases brought forward by party elites, that is public and party office-holders, should be more
likely to get through the acceptance stage than cases initiated by rank and file members. 
Fourth, we include the parties’ ideological left-right position using the rile score provided by
the Comparative Party Manifesto (CMP) data (Volkens et al 2016). By combining scores from
different  policy  categories  presented  in  the  manifesto  it  provides  an  estimate  of  the
ideological position of the party along a general left-right scale with a high and positive score
indicating more right-wing parties and low and negative score more left-wing parties. As
already outlined the formal rules regulating tribunals are very similar across parties but case
acceptance might also be influenced by party membership’s generalized values reflected in
the party’s manifesto. Tribunals in parties on the ideological left should accept more cases
because their post-materialist worldview usually suggests openness to challenge authority.
In contrast,  tribunals in more conservative and traditional parties should be less likely to
accept cases.13 
Fifth, party age, measured in years, distinguishes more institutionalized parties from younger
ones.  More institutionalized parties can afford to accept more cases as they pose lower
threats to party survival. 
Finally, we control for the number of party members. With increasing membership, internal
disagreement and the overall caseload of tribunals should rise. Tribunals of larger parties
13 Although Western  European post-materialist  parties often tend  to  the economic  left,  more traditional
positions need not necessarily be placed on the economic right. For example liberal parties with economically
conservative positions frequently pursue very progressive social policies. Similarly, some left parties, especially
traditional communist parties, might be socially conservative. In order to capture this we also ran a model
using  the  Society  (Progressive  -  Conservative)  variable  suggested  by  the  CMP  (see  Table  5  in  the  online
appendix). The variable is not statistically significant and does not affect our conclusions.
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may reject more cases than tribunals of smaller parties to manage their workload. We derive
membership figures from the MAPP project database (Spier 2014). We log both party age
and absolute  membership size  as  these variables  skew strongly  to  the right  side  of  the
distribution. 
Our online appendix includes a table with summary statistics and the bivariate correlations
between all explanatory variables in our data.
4.1 Overview of Tribunal Cases 
Table 1 gives an overview of all cases submitted and accepted by each party since the 1967
introduction of the German party law or the founding year of the party. Both the number of
cases and the acceptance rate varies considerably between parties.
Table 1: Tribunal Decisions in German Parties
Party
Name
Period
covered
No. of Approval
Stage Cases
No. of Decision
Stage Cases
Share of Decision
Stage Cases
CDU 1967-2015 329 245 74.47
CSU 1967-2015 102 72 70.59
FDP 1967-2015 98 88 89.80
Greens 1980-2015 92 76 82.61
Left 2007-2015 114 75 65.79
SPD 1967-2015 353 240 67.99
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Total 1967-2015 1088 796
Figure 1 displays the acceptance rate over ten five-year periods for each party. It becomes
immediately  apparent  that  our  data  also  contain  substantial  temporal  variation.  Yet  no
consistent trend across parties emerges. Newly founded parties such as the Greens and the
Left see a considerable increase in the number of cases accepted by their tribunals in the
second  period  after  they  enter  our  sample.  Yet  we  see  a  similar  uptick  in  the  Social
Democrats’ accepted cases in their second period even though the Social Democrats were
an established party in the second half of the 1970s. Moreover, the increase in accepted
cases for the Greens is far less steep than the increase for Social Democrats and the Left. In
contrast, the CDU, the CSU, and the FDP experience far milder changes in the number of
accepted cases over time.
Figure  1: Number  of  Accepted  Cases  by  Party  over  Time
5. Findings
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We estimate the likelihood of acceptance by using a logit model with random intercepts for
each  party.  As  Table  1  revealed  substantial  differences  between  parties,  the  random
intercepts help us capture residual variance not picked up by our control variables.14 Table 2
displays our regression models. Overall, we find strong support for a systematic pattern of a
political  logic in the acceptance stage of party tribunal cases in line with our theoretical
expectations. 
Model 1 only introduces the control variables (base model), while Models 2-4 add variables
associated  with  the  vote,  policy,  and  office  logics  respectively.  Model  5  combines  all
hypothesis tests into one model. Model 2 shows that tribunals of parties that lost votes in
the  last  election tend to  accept  a  higher  share  of  cases  as  expected  by  H1.1.  Similarly,
tribunals tend to reject more cases as election time approaches in line with H1.2. Turning to
the  policy  logic  in  Model  3,  tribunals  accept  fewer  cases  when  their  parties’  election
manifesto  displays  greater  policy  agreement.  Conversely,  tribunals  of  parties  with  high
disagreement over important policies reject fewer cases as expected by H2. 
Regarding the office logic,  we find mixed results  in  Model  4.  Parties in government are
associated  with  a  greater  acceptance  rate,  or  lower  rejection  rate,  of  cases  relative  to
opposition parties. While in line with our expectation in H3.1, the estimated effect fails to
reach conventional levels of statistical significance. However, the office logic clearly plays out
in the context of H3.2. as tribunals in parties that recently lost governmental power are far
more likely to accept cases than parties that did not experience such a loss. Except for H3.1,
our hypotheses receive support from the data when tested separately – a striking result
considering the guidelines set out in the German Party Law and parties’ tight regulations. 
Our integrated Model 5 continues to lend support to our theoretical  rationale.  Only the
estimated effect of our electoral proximity variable drops to the 10% level. In contrast, policy
agreement continues  to  be  statistically  significant  at  the  5%  level  and  vote  loss even
improves to be statistically significant at the 1% level. Given the theoretical and empirical
overlap  between  vote  losses  and  losing  governmental  power,  it  is  remarkable  that  we
continue to find the expected effects of vote losses and losing governmental power in the
14 We also tried party fixed effects models, which did not change our conclusions.
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joint model. The result suggests an independent effect of recent electoral underperformance
even for parties that did not lose office. 
Table 2: Hierarchical Logit Models of Case Acceptance by German Party Tribunals, 1967-2015. 
DV: Case accepted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vote Loss 0.100**
(0.041)
0.116*** 
(0.043)
Electoral Proximity 0.037**
(0.018)
0.030*
(0.018)
Policy Agreement -2.252**
(1.076)
-2.207**
(1.092)
Government Party 0.154
(0.170)
0.162 
(0.182)
Government Loss (t-
1)
2.289**
(1.027)
2.115**
(1.033)
Appeal 0.910***
(0.181)
0.854***
(0.183)
0.858***
(0.183)
0.873***
(0.181)
0.748***
(0.187)
Subject Matter -0.513***
(0.166)
-0.521***
(0.168)
-0.516***
(0.167)
-0.532***
(0.167)
-0.548***
(0.168)
Initiator 0.245
(0.165)
0.271
(0.167)
0.228
(0.165)
0.245
(0.165)
0.259
(0.167)
Ideology (Left-Right) 0.014***
(0.004)
0.014***
(0.004)
0.010**
(0.004)
0.013***
(0.004)
0.010**
(0.005)
Party Age (log) 0.225**
(0.113)
0.151
(0.116)
0.131
(0.121)
0.169 
(0.118)
-0.008
(0.131)
Membership Size 
(log)
-0.538***
(0.106)
-0.522***
(0.106)
-0.451***
(0.112)
-0.518***
(0.107)
-0.408***
(0.116)
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Constant 6.659***
(1.074)
6.372***
(1.075)
7.743***
(1.244)
6.529***
(1.087)
7.272***
(1.225)
Observations 1,045 1,044 1,044 1,045 1,044
Variance (Party RE) 0 0 0 0 0
Log Likelihood -565.814 -559.115 -562.326 -560.697 -552.315
AIC 1,147.628 1,138.230 1,142.653 1,141.395 1,130.629
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses.
The estimates of our controls reveal mixed results. In line with existing expectations, appeals
are more likely to make it through the approval stage, as are cases of membership expulsion
(the  baseline  category  in  the  subject  variable).15 The  estimated effect  of  party  left-right
positions  is  positive  and  statistically  significant  across  all  our  specifications.  This  rather
counterintuitive result suggests that more conservative parties tend to accept cases more
easily than progressive ones, or vice versa, that courts in more progressive parties tend to
reject cases more easily than conservative ones. Possibly, conservative parties do not only
propagate law and order in their policies but also respect these values in the intra-party
arena allowing for case to be heard. 
Tribunals of larger parties consistently seem to accept cases at lower rates than tribunals of
smaller parties. Although party elites have a slightly higher likelihood of seeing their cases
accepted we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference between elites and normal
party members. The effect of party age is inconsistent. In only one out of five specifications
is the estimate of party age positively and statistically significantly related to higher rates of
acceptance, and thus negatively related to rejections. Yet it in the remaining models it is not
statistically significant and suggests that younger parties tend to reject fewer cases in Model
5. Importantly, our variables pick up all relevant differences between parties. The estimated
variance of the party random effects is consistently zero. In fact, regular logit models without
random effects return the same results (see Table 4 in the online appendix).
15 We also tested whether our strategic logic differs for organizational challenges over membership
expulsions  by  interacting  each  of  our  main  explanatory  variables  with  the  subject  dummy.  We
estimated  likelihood  ratio  tests  by  comparing  the  interaction  models,  reported  in  the  online
appendix, and the simpler models reported in Table 2. On the basis of these tests, we conclude that
our hypotheses have similar effects in organizational and expulsion cases.
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Figure 2: Predicted changes in probability of case acceptance/rejection 
Having  discussed  the  general  direction  of  our  predicted  effects,  we  now  present  their
estimated substantive size.  Figure 2 portrays the predicted change in probability of case
acceptance (rejection) when moving the respective variable from one standard deviation
below its mean to one standard deviation above its mean while holding all other variables at
their means or modes. In the case of our two categorical variables, government party and
loss, we change their value from 0 to 1. The Figure compares the effects from Models 2-4 to
the joint model (5) for each explanatory variable. 
Losing four percentage points in vote shares relative to the last election, increases the case
acceptance rate by about ten percentage points. Similarly, increasing the time until the next
election from a little below a year to about three years,  increases the likelihood of case
acceptance by about 5 percentage points. Moving from a party with low to one with a high
programmatic  coherence  results  in  a  ten-percentage  point  decrease in  the likelihood of
accepting a case. Participating in government has only a negligible effect on the likelihood of
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case  acceptance  and  even  approaches  zero  in  Model  5.  In  contrast,  losing  access  to
governmental office clearly exerts the strongest effect among our explanatory variables and
increases the probability of case acceptance by about 20 percentage points. 
To put these numbers into context,  consider the CDU before and after the 1998 federal
elections. Helmut Kohl and his party suffered a 6.3 percentage point decrease in vote share
and lost government power. Our model thus predicts that the number of accepted cases
should rise by a factor of 1.35 from 1997/1998 to 1999/2000.16 An additional five-per cent
increase is predicted because we move from a time close to the election to a year in which
the next election is still years away but the electoral proximity effect is offset by the CDU’s
new status  as  an opposition party,  which accepts  fewer cases  than government parties.
Effectively, our model points in the right direction but over predicts the actual increase as
the observed rate of accepted cases rises from 82% in 1997/1998 to 93% in 1999/2000, an
increase of only 13%. When we compare the full  legislative periods from 1995-1998 and
1999  to  2002,  our  model  predicts  an  increase  in  the  acceptance  rate  by  30%  as  the
decreasing effect of proximity to election averages out. We observe that the CDU tribunals
accepted  almost  19% more  cases  after  1998  than  in  the  four  years  up  to  the  election
suggesting that our model's average predictions capture relevant empirical dynamics.
Conclusions
The paper theorizes and empirically examines how political dynamics affect political parties’
internal conflict regulation. Broadly speaking, our findings contribute to a growing literature
on intra-party conflict, that – to date – has been primarily interested in how parties resolve
conflict  in  particular  areas  (e.g.  in  government  coalitions),  of  a  particular  type  (e.g.
factionalism) or within particular parties (e.g. new parties) (e.g. Boucek 2009; 2012; Bäck
2008; Deschouwer 2008; Giannetti and Benoit 2008; Maor 1992; Scarrow 2005; Seeleib-
Kaiser  2010).  Day-to-day  mechanisms  of  conflict  regulation –  processes  that  tend to  be
hidden  –  have  received  much  less  attention  though  case  studies  of  party  decline  and
16  The prediction consists of a 15%-increase from losing 6% of the vote share and a 20% increase 
from losing government power. 
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disintegration suggest their importance for assuring the on-going functioning of parties (e.g.
de Lange and Art 2011; Bolleyer 2013; Bolleyer et al 2017). 
Specifically, we built on the literature on the politicization of state court and proposed a new
theoretical framework on the operation of intra-party tribunals as shaped by the core party
goals  of  vote maximization,  policy  implementation and office holding (Müller  and Strøm
1999). On that basis, we derived five hypotheses on the acceptance and rejection of tribunal
cases,  which  we  tested  using  novel  data  on  tribunal  decisions  within  German  parties
between 1967 and 2015.
Our empirical findings support our expectations that tribunals more easily approve cases
after  suffering  vote  losses  (H1.1)  and  tend  to  accept  fewer  cases  as  national  elections
approach (H1.2). Furthermore, tribunals in ideologically highly cohesive parties are less likely
to accept cases submitted to them (H 2) and tribunals more easily approve cases after a
party lost office (H3.2). In contrast, our hypothesis that tribunals within government parties
tend to accept fewer cases than their opposition counterparts did not find support. 
Overall,  our  findings  show  how  strategic  considerations  related  to  parties’  attempts  to
achieve three central goals –votes, policy and office - affect whether intra-party tribunals
accept cases or not. Echoing the existing literature (Müller and Strøm 1999)  we find party
tribunals to be influenced by all three goals, without one dominating the other. Moreover,
our findings indicate that the formal requirements that dictate political neutrality – even if
highly specific  - have little bite. This is a striking result given that, formally speaking, there is
no  leeway for tribunals to reject cases for reasons other than procedural violations given
detailed provisions on the set-up of intra-party tribunals in the German party law of 1967.
Nonetheless, political considerations play a central role in whether or not tribunals deal with
conflicts or bypass it by rejecting a case. Consequently, the politicization of party tribunals
should not be underestimated, even when party procedures formally have to replicate the
rule of law. To test the generalizability of our findings, one way is forward is to apply our
hypotheses  to ‘most similar’ scenarios to the German one, i.e. democracies that explicitly
require  political  parties  to  establish  internal  party  tribunals,  as  in  Czech  Republic  and
Romania, or even oblige them to emulate rule of law standards as in Portugal (Biezen and
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Piccio 2013: 43). Another one is to study tribunal decisions in parties that have introduced
independent  tribunals  voluntarily,  such  as  the  Liberal  Democrats  or  Greens  in  the  UK
(Bolleyer et al 2018), to explore whether politicization is indeed more pronounced in those
cases  where  legal  constraints  are  absent  as  we  would  expect. That  said,  though  the
generalizability of our findings needs further exploration, this paper is a first step towards
addressing the question to what extent it is possible to effectively transplant court structures
into an organizational setting and on tribunals’ ability to enhance intra-party democracy and
electoral fortunes of parties at the same time, two goals that seem difficult to reconcile.
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